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Abstract: Security is a complex and important non-functional requirement of software systems. According to 
Ross Anderson, “Many systems fail because their designers protect the wrong things, or protect the right things 
in the wrong way” [Anderson, 2001]. Surveys [Department of Trade and Industry, 2004] also show that security 
incidents in industry are rising, which highlights the difficulty of designing good security. Some recent 
approaches have targeted security from the technological perspective, others from the human computer 
interaction angle, offering better user interfaces for improved usability of security mechanisms. However 
usability issues also extend beyond the user interface, and should be considered during system requirements and 
design. In this paper we describe AEGIS, a methodology for the development of secure and usable systems. 
AEGIS defines a development process and a UML meta-model of the definition and the reasoning over the 
system’s assets.  AEGIS has been applied to case studies in the area of Grid computing and we report on one of 
these. 
1. Introduction 
Developing a secure software system is a 
complex and time-consuming process that seeks 
to accommodate frequently competing factors, 
such as functionality, scalability, simplicity, 
time-to-market, etc. Software engineering 
research has recently focused on improving the 
modelling abilities in terms of non-functional 
requirements such as stability [Jazayeri, 2002], 
performance [Denaro et al, 2004], fault tolerance 
[Guerra et al, 2003] and security [Jürjens, 2003]. 
In this paper we will focus in particular on 
security issues. 
Techniques to incorporate security issues in 
software design have already been developed 
[Jürjens, 2003, Schneier, 2003], however there is 
one important aspect of the design of complex 
secure systems which has always been 
neglected: current research in the field of Human 
Computer Interactions in Security (HCISec) 
illustrates that security mechanisms that do not 
work in practice are not effective [Adams et al, 
1999, Ka-Ping, 2002, McDermott et al, 1999, 
Whitten et al, 1999]. Most of the research in 
HCISec focuses on providing better user 
interfaces (UIs) [Ka-Ping, 2002, Whitten et al, 
1999], but it is clear that usability problems with 
secure systems are more than just UIs and need 
application of HCI factors and design 
methodology. 
Secure systems do not exist in a vacuum; they 
exist for the purpose of providing people with 
services and as such cannot operate without the 
involvement of people. In security, the focus 
tends to be on people who want to abuse the 
system (attackers). This is to the detriment of the 
regular users, who play an important part in 
protecting it. Any secure system is a socio-
technical system [Brostoff et al, 2001], and the 
requirements analysis and design process must 
take this into account. 
Most countermeasures require the involvement 
of people at some level. Users can have vastly 
different levels of experience, knowledge and 
expertise. Designing a system that appropriately 
accommodates these differing levels of aptitude 
and training is vital if the countermeasures are to 
be dependable. Therefore the design and the 
development of a secure software system require 
the inclusion of yet another important 
requirement: usability. 
This additional requirement introduces another 
layer of complexity in the development process. To date, no attempt in this direction has been 
made. In [Ka-Ping, 2002], ten guidelines for 
usable security are recommended, and in 
[Brostoff et al, 2001] a security design approach 
based on a safety-critical methods is proposed, 
but neither of these actually provides practical 
assistance or guidance for developers. At best, 
they are given a means of analysing a system, 
not building it. 
In [Flechais et al, 2003] we presented a novel 
method for building secure and usable software. 
In this paper we build and expand on that work 
and define the semantics of the steps of the 
development. We present the secure software 
development process AEGIS, which provides 
important tools for developing secure and usable 
systems. As part of AEGIS we define a UML 
meta-model identifying assets, the context of 
operation and supporting the modelling of 
security requirements. This clear semantics 
allows the developers and the users to formulate 
constraints and needs for the security aspects of 
the system in a simple but clear way, as shown 
in the case study reporting on our application of 
the work on Grid systems.  
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 
will present an overview of the AEGIS process, 
while Section 3 will describe the UML meta-
model for the AEGIS asset diagrams. In Section 
4 we will present a case study in which AEGIS 
has been applied. Section 5 discusses some of 
the results and compares AEGIS to other work 
and Section 6 summarises the paper and 
indicates possible future directions for this work. 
2. Overview of the AEGIS process 
Appropriate and Effective Guidance for 
Information Security (AEGIS) is a software 
development process for secure and usable 
systems. 
AEGIS is formulated to be a lightweight process 
that can fit into any software development 
process (for example in [Flechais et al, 2003], 
AEGIS was integrated into an incremental 
development process [Boehm, 1988]). The 
activity diagram in Figure 1 describes the core 
steps of AEGIS, which consist of identifying 
and securing the correct participants, getting 
them to model the system’s assets in context 
using our semantics defined through the UML 
[Object Management Group, 2003b] meta object 
facility [Object Management Group, 2003a], 
assign a value on these assets, conduct a risk 
analysis and, finally, design the countermeasures 
that address the risks in a cost effective way. 
Usability needs are addressed thanks to the 
participation of users in the security design, 
together with active consideration being given to 
the user context during both security 
requirements modelling and countermeasure 
design. 
In the next few sections we will give details of 
the different stages of the process. 
Identify Assets￿
Gather Participants￿
Model System Assets and Context￿
Value Assets according to security properties￿
Identify Threats￿ Identify Vulnerabilities￿ Identify Risks￿
Design Countermeasures￿




[Cost, Benefit and Residual Risk
are acceptable]￿
[Cost too high, Benefit too low]￿
 
Figure 1. AEGIS activity diagram 
2.1. Gather participants 
AEGIS is designed as a participative design 
methodology [James, 1996, Mumford, 1983, 
Straub et al, 1998]. That is to say that different 
stakeholders in the system are actively involved 
in the process of eliciting security requirements 
and deciding on security countermeasures. This 
is because the system stakeholders have the most 
pertinent domain knowledge. Therefore any 
decision taken by these stakeholders should take into  account their different needs – and 
specifically the need for usability. 
The first step is therefore to identify and secure 
the commitment of the stakeholders who will 
participate in that design. There are four main 
types of roles that can be differentiated 
(although an individual can play more than one 
role): 
• Decision makers. They consist of project 
management, owners (customers 
commissioning the system), and anybody else 
given a decision-making role in the 
development of the system. 
• Developers. They are the technical aspect of 
the design team, responsible for the capture and 
analysis of the system requirements down to 
the design and implementation. These include 
programmers, designers, security experts, 
interface designers, etc. 
• Users. They are the people that the system 
should be designed to work with, and as such 
are a major source of system requirements. 
• Facilitators. They are the people who run the 
AEGIS process, document the meetings and 
serve as mediators in general. 
Despite being traditionally regarded simply as a 
technical problem, the design of security is 
instead a socio-technical issue [Adams et al, 
1999] – i.e. designing and building security must 
involve both a technical and a social 
undertaking. Developers are the best equipped to 
handle the technical aspects of security; however 
the social aspects of security are generally the 
province of the owners and higher management, 
who have the authority to institute, encourage 
and enforce policies. 
This is why it is essential to ensure the 
participation of these groups of people: the 
decision makers – who are better suited to 
dealing with the enforcement of the social 
requirements of security, the developers – who 
are necessary for the technical implementation 
of security, the users – who are the ultimate 
source of usability requirements of the system, 
and the facilitators – who ensure the smooth 
running of the design process. 
An important additional aspect during this phase 
is to determine a single individual who will have 
leadership for the security of the project. The 
responsibility associated with this role is to 
document decision-making, citing the arguments 
and reasons for the decision, and to provide a 
final say in any disagreement that may occur 
during the process. 
2.2. Identify and model assets in context 
This step focuses on identifying the valuable 
parts of the system, and modelling them in the 
context in which they operate. Inspired by the 
HCI design methodology Contextual Design 
[Beyer et al, 1998], this contextual information 
is essential as a means of recreating the 
operating environment during the analysis and 
design phases, thereby ensuring that user needs 
are taken into account. 
AEGIS defines three major categories of assets – 






o Network link 
o Computer 






Operatives identify the people interacting with 
the system, whether users, developers or 
administrators. These assets tend to be the most 
overlooked of all, because they are not generally 
perceived as being a part of the system, but a 
customer of the system.  
Hardware assets are the physical entities in the 
system which need to be protected. From a 
security standpoint, an attacker who has physical 
access to the hardware is much more likely to 
succeed than one who does not. Identifying the 
presence and role of the physical assets in the 
system is therefore vital in the overall design of 
the security countermeasures. Data assets are subdivided into applications and 
information. Applications refer to the software 
that runs on various hardware assets. These will 
generally correspond to the more traditional 
architecture for the system (which concerns 
itself with the software architecture).  




A final category is that of security measures, 
which consists of any of the previous assets. 
Security measures can take the form of 
operatives (e.g. guards, administrators checking 
system logs, or users having secure passwords), 
hardware (e.g. dedicated optical networks that 
are much more resistant to interception, 
dedicated encryption hardware or random 
number generators) or data (e.g. a security 
policy governing the backup of information, an 
encryption algorithm, a firewall application or 
an encryption key). 
Once these assets have been identified, they can 
be modelled using the semantics defined in 
section 3.1. (see also Figure 5). Of critical 
importance in this phase is the recreation of the 
context in which the system operates. Context 
refers both to the physical and cultural 
environments that surround and affect the 
system. This step is crucial in providing the 
participants with the system knowledge 
necessary for designing a usable system later on. 
The next step consists of assigning a value to 
these assets according to various security 
properties as described in the following section. 
2.3. Value assets according to security 
In order to elicit security requirements from the 
participants, it is necessary to first explain and 
agree on the meaning of security properties. The 
three most common security properties are 
defined as follows [Gollman, 1999]: 
• Confidentiality: property of security that 
concerns unauthorised disclosure of 
information 
• Integrity: property of security that concerns 
unauthorised modification of information 
• Availability: property of security that 
concerns unauthorised withholding of 
information 
Security requirements elicitation is achieved, for 
each of the assets, by having the participants 
judge the importance of the asset in terms of the 
security properties defined above 
We recommend using a qualitative rating system 
based on natural language which gives 
flexibility in the rating of the assets, however it 
is equally possible to adopt quantitative rating 
systems. The qualitative approach allows 
participants to use their own words to define 
how important assets are, and by ranking the 
results hierarchically, a breakdown of the most 
important security properties for the assets can 
be identified. 
Experience has shown that scenarios are very 
useful in making participants both understand 
what the security property means, but also, how 
important it is in relation to the asset. These 
various scenarios should be documented, 
possibly in the form of abuse cases [McDermott 
et al, 1999] – UML use cases of an attacker and 
the actions taken to conduct an attack. 
For more information on the semantics of 
modelling the security requirements for the 
assets, see Section 3. The following step should 
consist of a risk analysis to identify threats, 
vulnerabilities and risks to the system. 
2.4. Risk analysis 
Risk analysis attempts to determine which 
threats and risks the system faces in order to 
feed into the design of security countermeasures 
that are appropriate to the threats and are cost-
effective to the risks. Knowledge of existing and 
past threats and vulnerabilities is essential, as is 
the presence of expert security knowledge in 
order to interpret and adapt this information to 
the situation at hand. 
This step is not about dictating the security 
needs of the system, it is about painting the 
picture of the threats, vulnerabilities and risks to 
the system in its current form. The designers, the 
developers and the decision makers should then use this information to decide if, what, and how 
much security should be built into the design. 
A risk analysis generally goes through a three-
step process of: 
• Identifying Threats – Threats are the 
potential sources of attacks to the system. 
Things that characterise threats include the 
attacker, their motive, their target, their 
resources and their risk-aversion. 
• Identifying Vulnerabilities – Vulnerabilities 
are areas of the system that are amenable to 
exploitation. This is where security advisories, 
security scanners, good knowledge of the 
technologies being used and information about 
past attacks become important. 
• Identifying Risks – Risk is the likelihood of 
an attack successfully exploiting one or a 
sequence of vulnerabilities in order to 
compromise an asset. This information is 
generally best acquired from security experts 
who have the knowledge and experience 
necessary to assess these risks. 
2.5. Security design 
This next phase is an iterative process of 
designing potential security measures and 
assessing their respective costs and benefits in 
the context in which they will be used. The aim 
of this is to reduce all the risks identified 
previously to an acceptable level, whilst 
ensuring the reliability of the system by 
providing usable mechanisms, education, 
incentives and disciplinary measures to motivate 
people in the system to behave in the expected 
manner. 
The design of the security should be driven by 
the risks identified previously, with attention 
being paid to those which are deemed to be most 
important. During this design, the cost of the 
implementation, deployment, operation and 
maintenance of the resulting secure system 
should be assessed. For usability purposes, the 
user cost of applying the measures in the context 
of operation should also be assessed and 
factored into the decision making. These costs 
should be evaluated against the benefits of the 
security measures and their ability to mitigate 
risks. 
In the next section we describe the UML meta-
model that is used to give semantics to the assets 
definition specified by the participants. 
3. Asset model semantics: 
3.1. Asset model 
The semantics for an asset model are described 
using the UML Meta Object Facility [Object 
Management Group, 2003a] as can be seen in 
Figure 2. The meta-model defines the semantics 
for models of assets which can then be built by 
the participants. The reasons for choosing UML 
for this kind of modelling are obvious: UML is a 
well-understood notation among developers, it is 
widely supported and easy to extend (through 
the meta object facility). The simplicity of the 
extension means that non-experts can also easily 
understand and use this as a starting point if 
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Figure 2. Asset model semantics 
Four new objects are defined in the meta-model 
in Figure 2: 
• asset 
• operative • physicalEnviroment 
• culturalEnvironment 
Although we have previously identified 
operatives as being assets, the AEGIS meta-
model refines the semantics with a distinction 
between  operative and asset. This is to 
accommodate the differences of interaction that 
operatives have with other assets and other 
operatives. Bearing in mind the similarity of an 
operative to a UML user, the same look was 
chosen to depict an operative, as seen in 
Figure 3. 
operative￿ 
Figure 3. Diagram for operative 
In addition to the assets and operatives, the 
physical and cultural context surrounding both 
the assets and operatives can also be depicted 
through the physicalEnvironment and 
culturalEnvironment components. Asset 
and operative both extend the UML MOF 
classifier and should therefore be modelled 
as such (see figure 5 for an example). 
physicalEnvironment and 
culturalEnvironment both extend the 
core UML package and should therefore be 
modelled as packages. These two components 
can thus contain assets and operatives 
and serve to represent the boundaries of both 
physical environments (such as rooms) and 
cultural environments (such as security culture). 
For example, a system administrator operative 
and a secretary operative sharing the same room 
should be apparent. 
3.2. Security requirement modelling 
In order to document the security requirements, 
Asset is a classifier (Figure 4) that contains 
securityAttributes, which have been 
defined as confidentialityAttribute, 
integrityAttribute and 
availabilityAttribute. These attributes 







Figure 4. Diagram for asset 
Additional attributes can also be defined, such as 
for example a non-repudiation attribute or 
dependability attribute, depending on the needs 
of the system. These securityAttributes 
extend the core attribute element of the 
UML MOF and can thus be depicted in a similar 
manner. Thus, an asset can be drawn as shown 
in Figure 4. 
4. Case study: 
AEGIS has been applied in a number of case 
studies involving Grid projects. These projects 
are developing the technology and expertise 
necessary to deploy large scale distributed 
networks for the purpose of providing access to 
very large sets of data (where normal 
distribution channels are inadequate), access to 
computational facilities (such as the spare CPU 
cycles on home computers, or specific 
supercomputers for instance) or a combination 
of both. Since the field of Grid computing is 
relatively recent, the security requirements and 
difficulties in building suitable countermeasures 
are not very well understood. Furthermore, the 
vast storage capability, processing power and 
bandwidth that makes Grids so useful also 
makes them prime targets for malicious attacks. 
In order to test and validate the usefulness of 
AEGIS as well as its ease of use (for facilitators 
and developers), it has been taught to a group of 
graduate software engineering students who then 
applied the process to four different grid 
projects. We report here on one of the sessions, 
which involved a biological simulation grid 
project. 
4.1. Learning AEGIS 
The principles and processes of AEGIS were 
taught to a group of six students in a two-hour 
session. The basic principles of AEGIS were explained through a series of slides, as well as a 
sample asset model. Once this introduction 
completed, the students were given a manual 
and access to two members of the biological 
simulation grid project. 
The two members of the project were able to 
represent both a developer and a system user 
point of view and their participation was secured 
for two hours and thirty minutes (although the 
user unfortunately had to leave after one hour). 
The students were given the tasks of identifying 
the security needs of the project and conducting 
as much of a security analysis as possible within 
the timeframe. 
Initial questions from the students were focussed 
on understanding what the project was about and 
how the basic architecture functioned. The grid 
project was described as providing a group of 
universities a means of centralising access to 
different “simulations of molecules of biological 
importance”. 
It was quickly identified that the project was 
expected to provide a secure environment for 
these different universities to operate in. In 
addition to this, there were long-term plans to 
expand the system to private sector 
pharmaceutical companies. In light of this, the 
need to provide a secure environment was 
further reinforced by the fact that the private 
sector had very high confidentiality 
requirements, to the extent that “it’s really hard 
to convince them [pharmaceutical companies] 
to share their data with anybody – to even go 
outside of their own building”. 
Although  academic use and provision of 
simulation data was free of confidentiality 
constraints, the private sector had very high 
requirements of confidentiality for their own 
simulations. A long-term aim of the project was 
therefore to provide their software to these 
private companies so they could federate their 
own databases in a compatible format and query 
the union of the private and public databases, but 
not allow queries from outside access to their 
own simulations. 
The importance of the biological simulation 
data, also called trajectories, was further 
identified through the following questions 
“would you place a high cost on producing the 
data? The manpower and equipment 
involved…”,  “would the R&D of other 
pharmaceutical companies be interested [in this 
data]?”. Both answers were positive and 
showed that producing the data was expensive 
and the simulations could be very valuable to 
third parties. 
4.2. Modelling the system 
At this point, the students tended to want to 
focus on the specific security needs of the 
confidentiality of the database of simulations. 
After a quick reminder that the analysis should 
start by identifying all the assets and various 
stakeholder operatives, the students started 
building an asset model later formalised as can 
be seen in Figure 5. 
The grid project representatives initially had 
trouble understanding what was required of 
them “what do you mean by asset?”, although 
the students were quickly able to explain and 
lead them through an analysis. The modelling 
process consisted of one student drawing the 
asset model onto a whiteboard while the group 
of students as a whole asked detailed questions 
about the architecture that would inform the 
diagram. 
For example, having identified that the project 
was geared to providing users with simulation 
data, the then users asked questions about how 
this data was served to the user, what kind of 
server it resided on, where the server was 
housed, and so on. This in turn led to the 
identification of a number of other assets, such 
as the application server which provided 
authentication, authorisation and accountability 
services. Apart from the basic user, operatives 
were identified by asking leading questions, 
such as “who is in charge of maintaining the 
system”, “who has access to the server room”, 
or “who supplies the information in the 
database”. These operatives were then modelled 
as shown in figure 5. The interactions between 
the operatives and the assets were identified 
throughout the process of building the model, 
such as the administrative task of maintaining the authentication mechanism which became 
apparent when the students identified the 
existence of that asset. 
One finding that corroborates other AEGIS case 
studies was that many of the administrative 
duties in the system, such as backup, patching, 
maintenance of the authentication mechanism 
(in this case based on SSL digital certificates, 
and a username and password combination for 
users who don’t have certificates), and 
maintenance of the authorisation mechanism 
(role-based access control) were not initially 
apparent. Identifying these required detailed and 
probing questions, for example when the 
representatives mentioned that the system was 
backed up (“who backs the system up? Is there a 
policy for when and what to backup?”), or that 
digital certificates were used to authenticate 
users (“How do users get a certificate?”, “Who 
do they apply to for access to the 
system?”).  What is interesting is 
that simply establishing that an 
administrator has to monitor, 
backup, and maintain the system 
– with little to no supervision or 
help – throws up a number of 
questions with regards to both 
the scalability of the system (can 
the tasks expected of the 
administrator be extended to 
cover one or two orders of 
magnitude more users?) and the 
effectiveness of the current 
system security (which in the 
absence of training, audit and 
documented policies is wholly 
dependent on the competence of 
the administrator – not on the 
technical countermeasures). 
4.3. Identifying security 
requirements 
Building on the discussion at the 
start of the analysis, students 
tried to get the representative to 
rate the confidentiality 
requirement of the trajectory files 
(simulation data). “How 
important is it for you to be able 
to keep this secret?” to which the answer was 
“we have no need for confidentiality… At the 
moment.” When questioned further, “from an 
academic user point of view, using your own 
words, how would you rate, how important 
would confidentiality be? Would it be low, 
unimportant, high, essential…” The answer was 
that the requirement for confidentiality was low, 
however from the pharmaceutical company’s 
point of view, the requirement for confidentiality 
was deemed to be medium to high in some 
cases. However since the system did not 
currently involve pharmaceutical companies, the 
current requirement was originally judged to be 
low. 
From a requirements point of view, capturing 
this information is important. On the one hand, 
the system as it is does not require that particular 












confidentiality : String  = med/high
integrity : String  = essential
availability : String  = med/high
DB2_Interface
confidentiality : String  = low
integrity : String  = essential
availability : String  = med/high
trajectory




confidentiality : String  = high
integrity : String  = high
availability : String  = med/high
authorisation_module
confidentiality : String  = high
integrity : String  = high
availability : String  = med/high
accounting_Module
confidentiality : String  = high
integrity : String  = high
availability : String  = medium
data_Mining_Module
confidentiality : String  = low
integrity : String  = essential


























Figure 4. Case Study Asset Model envisioned in a future development may have a 
high requirement for this kind of security. 
Furthermore this also illustrates the need to 
identify and represent as many stakeholders in 
the system as possible to identify potentially 
conflicting viewpoints. As can be seen in Figure 
5, the confidentiality requirement for trajectory 
was therefore rated as “low/high”, which 
highlights this basic conflict. 
Identifying the security requirements of other 
assets did not highlight any further conflicts, and 
it was quickly established that the integrity of 
the trajectory files was the most important 
security requirement of the system. This was 
because the whole purpose of the system was to 
provide  accurate data. Thanks to the 
dependencies of the integrity of the trajectory 
files, the database was also judged to have an 
equal need for integrity. The availability of the 
data was not judged to be very important in the 
short-term, but in a future commercial 
application this would be more important. This 
was further justified by the fact that the project 
had already designed server mirrors in the 
architecture of the system. 
Another series of assets that proved to be of 
interest were the authentication, authorisation 
and accounting modules. Although they were 
originally expected to resolve security issues in 
the system, the identification of high integrity 
and confidentiality requirements show that they 
also raise security issues. It is in this type of area 
that AEGIS shows its main difference from 
other security approaches, because it takes the 
point of view that every asset, including the 
security measures, has specific needs. These 
effectively highlight the need for good usability, 
training, incentives and enforcement for security 
measures that require the involvement of an 
operative. Without those, the requirements of the 
security measures may not be met. 
5. Discussion and related work: 
As shown in the case study, a number of issues 
were identified through AEGIS. First of these 
was that the security roles of operatives in a 
system are frequently overlooked, and technical 
security mechanisms are generally assumed to 
solve a security problem. By identifying security 
requirements on security mechanisms, these new 
security problems are highlighted. Modelling the 
tasks that operatives must perform in the system 
also helps to highlight some of these problems. 
Although the case study shows that some 
confusion existed at the beginning of the 
process, the participants quickly adopted the 
method, and in a relatively short period of time 
new issues and requirements were identified. 
This also highlights the importance of the role of 
facilitator in the process of AEGIS where it is 
easy to get sidetracked on a particular area, 
whilst ignoring a multitude of other problems. 
A final point concerns the resolution of 
conflicting requirements. Different stakeholders 
in the system will have different points of view 
about what is important to them. This is typical 
of any reasonably large engineering project and 
establishes the need for making decisions based 
on conflicting data. With regards to security, it is 
very important to understand the need for the 
cost-benefit analysis of any security decision. 
The differences between the short and long-term 
security needs in the system do not necessarily 
have to cause serious difficulties. It is cheaper to 
compromise on a short-term implementation 
than it is to compromise on the long-term 
design. Any security mechanisms that have been 
designed but not implemented will be cheaper to 
implement at a later date than in a system where 
it is necessary to overhaul its original design. 
6. Summary and future work: 
AEGIS has been presented as a development 
process that provides both usability and security. 
Through the definition of MOF-compliant 
semantics, we have described an asset model 
notation, capable of documenting security 
requirements. By modelling the context in which 
the system operates and the interactions of the 
operatives and the assets of the system, this 
notation also allows the documentation of 
usability needs. Finally, we have presented a 
case study in which AEGIS was taught and 
applied to a grid project. The case study 
highlighted that AEGIS is easy to learn, 
provides a clear means of documenting security requirements and is useful in identifying the role 
and importance of operatives in the system. 
Future work may include identifying issues 
concerning the resolution of conflicts in security 
requirements gathering, incorporating decision 
making support, improving tools support for 
AEGIS and also integrating AEGIS into Model 
Driven Architectures [Object Management 
Group, 2004]. 
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